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Abstract
Christian religiosity is linked to traditional marriage attitudes. This article jointly studies individual,
contextual and cross-level effects of Christian religiosity on marriage attitudes. In doing so, this article
sheds light on the issue of how a key institution like religion influences societal values. Is it only via
compositional effects, with larger numbers of religious people leading to more positive marriage atti-
tudes in a society? Or does religion also have ‘emergent properties’ that have an additional effect on
marriage attitudes on top of the compositional effect? Finally, we examine whether the strength of the
link between individual religiousness and marriage attitudes depends on the religious context. We
use data from the ESS 2006 and use the regional level as our preferred contextual level. Our results
show that Christian religiosity has individual, contextual and cross-level effects. It is level of religiosity
rather than type of denomination that matters. In more religious regions, both the religious and the
non-religious hold more traditional marriage attitudes. Finally, although the more religious hold more
positive marriage attitudes in both low and high religious contexts, the difference between both
groups is much smaller in low than in high religious contexts. This suggests that an adaptation mech-
anism among religious people in secularized contexts is at work.
Introduction
It is well-established that Christians (and most adherents
of other religions) generally hold more traditional mar-
riage attitudes than the non-religious, with the former
being much more likely than the latter to object to
behaviours such as unmarried cohabitation and divorce,
that are seen as undermining the centrality of marriage
(Thornton, 1985; Pearce and Thornton, 2007;
Adamczyk, 2013; Wilkins-LaFlamme, 2016). This gen-
eral statement, however, does not take into account the
wide variety of social contexts in which religious differ-
ences express themselves. In the past decades, processes
like secularization and the fall of Communism have
shaken up the religious map of Europe. Nowadays, large
variability exists across countries and across regions
within countries in the proportion of people that belong
to a Christian denomination. Moreover, among
Christians, large variation exists in the extent to which
they identify with and engage in religion and religious
activity. This raises a number of questions on the
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relationship between Christianity and marriage atti-
tudes. A first question is which aspect of Christianity
matters. Is it whether people identify themselves as
Christians at all, is it the denomination they adhere to,
or is it the extent to which people actively identify with
and engage in religion and religious activity? Most stud-
ies that examine the relationship between religiosity and
attitudes suggest that both active engagement and de-
nomination matter, but their relative importance varies
across studies, with active engagement generally (Moore
and Vanneman, 2003; Pearce and Thornton, 2007;
Finke and Adamczyk, 2008; Halman and Van Ingen,
2015), but not always (Adamczyk, 2008), being more
important than denomination.
A second question is whether religion only is import-
ant for its adherents or whether it also influences the
broader community. Christianity is a major societal in-
stitution, and it could be that just living in a context that
is highly religious may influence marriage attitudes,
even for those who do not or only slightly identify them-
selves as religious. Evidence is not unequivocal though,
with some studies suggesting that people hold more
traditional attitudes in more religious contexts
(Thornton, 1985; Moore and Vanneman, 2003; Finke
and Adamczyk, 2008; Adamczyk and Hayes, 2012;
Wilkins-LaFlamme, 2016), whereas others did not find
such a contextual effect (Jaspers, Lubbers and De Graaf,
2007; Adamczyk, 2008). If a contextual effect would
exist, the question is how large it is in comparison to the
effect of indicators of individual religiosity.
A third question is whether the strength of the rela-
tionship between individual religiosity and marriage
attitudes depends on the religious context. People’s
marriage attitudes may be influenced by the combin-
ation of their individual religiosity and the religious
context. For instance, if Christians live in a relatively
secular context they may adapt their family attitudes
and become more similar to the non-religious than if
they live in a very Christian context (Finke and
Adamczyk, 2008). However, the opposite could also
be true, with Christians being more prone to stress
their religious identity–and concomitant attitudes–in
a secular context than they would had they lived
in a more religious context (Jaspers, Lubbers and De
Graaf, 2007).
The aim of this article is to disentangle these different
effects of religion on marriage attitudes. First, we make
a distinction between three different aspects of individ-
ual religiosity; whether people adhere to Christianity at
all, which denomination they adhere to, and the extent
to which individuals are religiously involved. Second,
we examine the importance of religious context. Are
people in more religious contexts more likely to embrace
traditional family attitudes than people in less religious
contexts? And does the denomination matter at the con-
textual level? Whereas many studies focus on the coun-
try level (Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006; Finke and
Adamczyk, 2008; Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Huijts and
Kraaykamp, 2011), we mainly focus on the regional
level (Adamczyk, 2008; Lim and MacGregor, 2012;
Wilkins-LaFlamme, 2016), as quite some heterogeneity
in level of religiosity exists within countries. In addition,
in some countries the dominant denomination varies by
region. Finally, we examine whether the strength of the
link between individual religiousness and marriage atti-
tudes depends on the religious context. Together, this
allows us to jointly study individual, contextual, and
cross-level effects of different aspects of religiosity on
marriage values. Disentangling these three different
types of effects is important from a sociological perspec-
tive, as it sheds light on the issue of how a key institution
like religion influences societal values regarding mar-
riage. Is it only via compositional effects, with larger
numbers of religious people leading to more positive
marriage attitudes in a society? Or does religion also
have ‘emergent properties’, with it having an additional
effect on marriage attitudes on top of the compositional
effect?
To answer our central questions, we use data from
the third wave of the ESS (2006) for 25 European coun-
tries, in which questions on people’s attitudes towards
divorce, non-marital cohabitation, and childbearing in
non-marital cohabitation were posed. We focus on the
three main strands of Christianity1 in Europe: Roman
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy.2
Theory and Hypotheses
Which Aspects of Christianity Matter for
Individual Marriage Attitudes?
Marriage is a living arrangement that is highly valued in
Christian teaching (Yarhouse and Nowacki, 2007). It is
viewed as a sacrament in most strands of Christianity,
like Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and in many
Protestant denominations, like Lutheranism. This focus
on marriage has led most Christian denominations to be
sceptical about or outright oppose family decisions and
living arrangements that conflict with marriage, such as
divorce and unmarried cohabitation. Given that all
mainstream Christian denominations emphasize the im-
portance of marriage, we expect that marriage attitudes
are generally quite traditional among people who adhere
to the Christian faith. Those who are not religious are
expected to be less susceptible to Christian views on
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marriage and thus to value marriage less strongly. In line
with this reasoning, several studies have shown that the
non-religious hold less traditional marriage attitudes
than adherents of most Christian denominational
strands (Halman and Van Ingen, 2015; Wilkins-
LaFlamme, 2016). Thus, our first hypothesis is that:
H1: Members of Christian denominations hold more
traditional marriage attitudes than the non-religious.
Although all denominations emphasize the value of
marriage, this emphasis might not be equally strong
across denominations. Protestantism historically stresses
individual responsibility rather than hierarchical subor-
dination, and this should result in more leeway for indi-
vidual decision-making within Protestantism than in
Roman Catholicism (Cohen and Hill, 2007).
Furthermore, most European mainstream Protestant
denominations have become quite reluctant to formulate
strict prescriptions concerning personal behaviour
(Dobbelaere, 1981). Marriage attitudes are generally
quite strict in most strands of Orthodoxy (Stan, 2010).
In general, it leads us to expect that Protestants will
value marriage less strongly than members of the other
large strands of Christianity. Therefore, our second hy-
pothesis is that:
H2: Members of Protestant denominations hold less
traditional marriage attitudes than members of Roman
Catholicism and Orthodox denominations.
In individualized societies, membership in religious
denominations may have lost some of its importance, as
members vary widely in the extent that they participate
in religious practices and identify with religious denomi-
nations. From this perspective, it can be argued that it is
not only (or maybe not so much) whether individuals
are members of religious denominations, but how strong
their religious involvement is that matters. Those who
are not involved will less likely base their opinions about
marriage on the views of their denomination, whereas
this is much more likely among those who are strongly
involved in religious denominations. Religious commun-
ities have a socializing function: internalization of reli-
gious guidelines on family matters is likely to be
stimulated by going to church and being part of a reli-
gious community. In addition, those who are more reli-
gious probably also are more susceptible to normative
pressure to follow these guidelines. Numerous studies
have shown the importance of religious involvement as
a predictor of family related attitudes (Jaspers, Lubbers
and De Graaf, 2007; Finke and Adamczyk, 2008;
Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Adamczyk, 2013; Halman
and Van Ingen, 2015; Wilkins-LaFlamme, 2016). This
leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: The more religious people are, the more traditional
marriage attitudes they will hold.
The question is whether this effect will dominate the
effect of denomination, that is, whether it will make po-
tential differences in marriage attitudes between
denominations disappear and perhaps even differences
between those who do consider themselves as Christians
and those who do not consider themselves as members
of any religious denomination.
Does the Religious Context Matter for Individual
Marriage Attitudes?
The discussion in the previous section suggests that reli-
gion influences the societal attitude towards marriage
via the individual attitudes and behaviours of its mem-
bers (or its more committed members). The higher the
number of religious individuals in a societal context, the
more traditional attitudes towards marriage in that con-
text will be. However, this compositional effect need not
be the only way in which religion exerts an influence on
marriage attitudes in society. In most Western societies,
Christian denominations have developed into powerful
institutions that are able to shape both the cultural cli-
mate within a society and exert an influence on major
rules and regulations concerning issues that they deem
important. Although the influence of religious institu-
tions in these societies has been waning during the last
half-century (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008), denomina-
tions still exert or try to exert considerable influence on
institutional arrangements. Examples of Christian
denominations’ institutional involvement within the
realm of family values are the opposition to a relaxation
of divorce laws, the institutionalization of same-sex
marriage, and the granting of equal rights to cohabiting
couples. But apart from this institutional involvement,
the pervasive, long-standing influence of Christian
denominations on the cultural climate within a society
may affect the marriage attitudes of those who are not
very committed and even of those who do not identify
with a religious denomination at all.
If the strength of a religion to influence the cultural
climate and institutional arrangements in a societal con-
text lies in its institutional power, one would expect that
the marriage attitudes would depend primarily on the
proportion of people who are a member of religious
denominations. At the same time, we expect this effect
to be weaker for Protestantism than for the other
denominations, as we expect Protestants to be less
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traditional than members of the other two large denomi-
nations. In line with this idea, we formulate a fourth
hypothesis:
H4: The higher the proportion of members of a religious
denomination in a region, the more likely it is that peo-
ple hold traditional marriage attitudes. This effect is
weaker for Protestantism than for Roman Catholicism
and Orthodoxy.
If the strength of religion primarily lies in the convic-
tion of committed believers to spread their attitudes to
others, marriage attitudes in a societal context would
mainly depend on the level of religiosity of individual
believers. This idea is reflected in our fifth hypothesis:
H5: The higher the general level of religiosity in a re-
gion, the more likely it is that people hold traditional
marriage attitudes.
Two studies that examined contextual effects of reli-
gion on family related attitudes have focused on the pro-
portion of members of religious denominations, and
thus investigated whether strength in numbers matter
(Moore and Vanneman, 2003; Wilkins-LaFlamme,
2016). In both instances, the hypothesis was confirmed.
One study examined whether the level of religiosity in a
societal context is related to attitudes—and thus in a
sense whether the strength of convictions matter (Finke
and Adamczyk, 2008). Again, the findings were in line
with expectations. However, no study as yet examined
whether both contextual effects are operative at the
same time or whether one is dominating the other.
Does the Link Between Individual Religiosity and
Marriage Attitudes Depend on the Level of
Religiosity in the Societal Context?
Most modern societies are undergoing a process of secu-
larization (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008). The most com-
mon view on secularization is that this implies that the
proportion of the population that agrees with a religious
worldview is diminishing. However, apart from this pro-
cess of ‘external’ secularization, religious communities
may also undergo a process of ‘internal’ secularization.
By internal secularization, we mean a process in which
the ‘translation’ of the religious doctrines to the personal
lives of the religious is increasingly left to religious indi-
viduals themselves (Dobbelaere, 1981). Instead of the re-
ligious community deciding on what the religious
doctrines imply, individuals themselves are to decide on
this. It can be expected that such a process of ‘internal’
secularization is more likely in regions where the process
of external secularization has also advanced, than in
regions where external secularization is not very wide-
spread. This could imply that religious individuals in
highly secularized regions pay less attention to denomin-
ational teachings on marriage than religious individuals
in regions where most people are still religious. In add-
ition, in secularized contexts the religious may experi-
ence normative pressure from the non-religious majority
to ‘modernize’ their views on issues like unmarried co-
habitation and divorce and to align these views with
those of the non-religious majority. This idea of religious
individuals adapting their attitudes to that of the non-
religious majority leads us to formulate the following
hypothesis:
H6A: The less religious a region is, the weaker the posi-
tive effect of individual religion on traditional marriage
attitudes.
This hypothesis is in line with the idea behind the hy-
pothesis of moral communities (Stark, 1996). Stark argued
that religion produces conformity to its norms only when
it is sustained through interaction and accepted by the ma-
jority as a valid basis for action. Stark used this reasoning
to explain why in studies from the secularized pacific re-
gion of the United States no correlation was found between
individual religious involvement and youth delinquency,
whereas studies from more religious parts of the United
States showed the expected negative correlation.
Alternatively, one could argue that being a minority
of believers in a non-religious environment could lead to
a re-affirmation of differences in attitudes between the
religious and the non-religious, also referred to as reli-
gious polarization (Wilkins-LaFlamme, 2016). First, in a
highly secularized context, those who remain religious
may become a rather selective group of ‘die-hard’
believers who stress traditional values. Second, the ex-
perience of being a minority whose beliefs are under
siege may make believers wanting to show that they dif-
fer from their secular environment, and this may lead to
a re-affirmation of traditional teachings. This reasoning
would lead us to expect that the differences in the cen-
trality of marriage between Christians and the nonreli-
gious are stronger in secularized contexts than in non-
secularized ones. Thus, we formulate the contrasting
hypothesis:
H6B: The less religious a region is, the stronger the posi-
tive effect of individual religion on marriage attitudes.
We will investigate the cross-level interaction be-
tween individual and regional religion for denomination
(membership) as well as level of religiosity.
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Studies provide mixed support for both of the
hypotheses formulated above. In line with H6A, Finke
and Adamczyk (2008) find that the positive relationship
between the importance that individuals attach to reli-
gion and conservative sexual morality is weaker in less
religious countries. However, the relationship between
religious attendance and sexual morality did not depend
on how religious a country was. Several other studies
have reported results that seem to favour H6B. Moore
and Vanneman (2003) find that differences in gender
attitudes between fundamentalists and non-
fundamentalists are larger in US states with relatively
low numbers of fundamentalists than in US states with
relatively many fundamentalists. Wilkins-LaFlamme
(2016) reports that the differences in family values be-
tween committed members of denominations and non-
members are larger in regions with more people who are
not affiliated to a religious denomination. Jaspers,
Lubbers and De Graaf (2007) found that the effect of
being religious on attitudes towards homosexuality and
euthanasia in the Netherlands increased over time be-
tween 1975 and the late 90s, hence when the
Netherlands became more secularized. Two other stud-
ies do not test the cross-level interaction directly, but re-
port that the effect of own religious importance on
attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, and divorce
is stronger in countries with strong self-expression atti-
tudes (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Adamczyk, 2013),
which also suggests the relevance of the re-affirmation
mechanism.
The studies mentioned above differ in how they de-
fine the religious context. Some studies measure the pro-
portion of people that are members of religious
denominations (Moore and Vanneman, 2003; Wilkins-
LaFlamme, 2016), whereas others emphasize the general
level of importance that is attached to religion (Finke
and Adamczyk, 2008; Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009;
Adamczyk, 2013). This suggests that it is not a priori
clear which aspect(s) of the religious context matter for
these interaction effects. Therefore, we will examine




To test our hypotheses, we used data from the third
wave of the European Social Survey (2006–2007). This
wave is the only ESS wave to date that contains informa-
tion on attitudes concerning behaviours that could be
viewed as challenging the centrality of marriage, like
divorce, unmarried cohabitation, and having children
outside marriage. Data were collected among 47,099
respondents in 25 countries, using face-to-face inter-
views. The sampling strategy varied between countries,
depending on their access to sampling sources, but were
all based on the same basic principles of strict probabil-
ity and representativeness. The ESS aims to be represen-
tative of residential populations aged 15 years and older,
regardless of nationality or citizenship. Response rates
per country varied between 46.0 per cent and 73.2 per
cent. The (unweighted) average response rate was 63.5
per cent.
Given our focus on differences between Christians
belonging to one of the three major Christian churches
(Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy) and people
who do not consider themselves as belonging to any reli-
gion, we excluded respondents identifying with smaller
Christian denominations (2.0 per cent) and non-Christian
religions (1.8 per cent). Furthermore, we excluded 4.6 per
cent of our sample due to missing values on one or more
of our variables. This left us with 43,242 respondents
nested in 226 regions, which in turn are nested in 25 coun-
tries (see Table 2 for the countries included).
Contextual Level: Country or Region?
A critical issue in testing our contextual hypotheses is
what constitutes the best level of aggregation. Many
studies focus on the country as the contextual level of
interest. However, it is not clear that this is optimal.
Both the level of religiosity and the membership of
Christian denominations show regional variation within
countries (see below). Thus, a focus on regions within
countries seems warranted. There is a practical reason
to focus on the regional level as well; parameter esti-
mates and their standard errors may be imprecise and
biased if the number of level-2 units included in a multi-
level analysis is limited (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). The
number of countries in the dataset is only 25, whereas
we distinguished 226 regions. Therefore, we decided to
focus on the regional level, but controlling for the fact
that regions are nested within countries. Furthermore, as
explained in the Analytical strategy section below, we
ran additional sensitivity analyses in which effects of de-
nomination and level of religiosity were estimated both
at the regional and country level.
Variables
Individual-level variables
Three items measured attitudes towards marriage.
Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point
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Likert-scale running from ‘strongly disapprove’ to
‘strongly approve’ to what extent they approved or dis-
approved if a woman/man (1) lives with a partner with-
out being married to him/her, (2) has a child with a
partner she/he lives with but is not married to, and (3)
gets divorced while she/he has children aged under 12.
Respondents were randomly assigned to a set of ques-
tions about the behaviour of women or to a set of ques-
tions about the behaviour of men.3 The reliability of the
resulting scale was good, in particular given the small
number of items (Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.70). We used the
mean score on the three items as our indicator of mar-
riage attitudes; the higher the score, the stronger
respondents favoured marriage.
Religious membership was measured with the ques-
tion: ‘Do you consider yourself as belonging to any par-
ticular religion?’ (1¼ yes, 0¼ no). Those who answered
‘yes’ were asked to which religion they belonged. This
variable indicates self-identified membership or belong-
ing, rather than official membership. We distinguished
between Catholics, Protestants (including Anglicans),
and Orthodox (Greek as well as Russian Orthodox).
Respondents who belonged to smaller Christian denomi-
nations or to other religions were excluded.
Three items were used to measure level of religiosity.
The first item read ‘Regardless of whether you belong to
a particular religion, how religious would you say you
are?’, with response options running from ‘not at all reli-
gious’ (0) to ‘very religious’ (10). The second item was
‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and
funerals, about how often do you attend religious serv-
ices nowadays?’ The wording of the third item was
‘Apart from when you are at religious services, how
often, if at all, do you pray?’ The last two items both
had scores ranging from ‘every day’ (1) to ‘never’ (7). A
factor analysis (principal component analysis) showed
one clear factor underlying these three items. Country-
specific analyses showed that—depending on the coun-
try—a one-factor model explained between 61 and 79
per cent of the variance in these items. In the pooled
dataset this factor explained 76 per cent of the variance.
The standardized factor score was used to indicate
respondents’ level of religiosity. The higher the score,
the stronger religiously involved respondents were. If
one item was missing, it was substituted by the average
value of respondents with the same score on one of the
other two items (in 1.9 per cent of the cases such a sub-
stitution was made, mostly because of a missing on fre-
quency of prayer).
We included a small set of variables that could both
be related to our key independent and dependent vari-
ables, and thus lead to spurious correlations between
religiousness and marriage attitudes. The following
control variables were included; gender (0¼male,
1¼ female), age (in years), level of educational attain-
ment, migrant status (0¼born in the country of resi-
dence, 1¼ born elsewhere), and level of urbanization.
Educational attainment was measured using the
ISCED system, with five categories, running from ‘less
than secondary education’ (ISCED 0–1) to ‘tertiary
education completed’ (ISCED 5–6). ‘Upper secondary
education completed’ (ISCED 3) was chosen as the ref-
erence category. Level of urbanization was measured
by five categories as well, ranging from ‘a farm or
home in the country side’ to ‘a big city’ (reference cat-
egory). Table 1 provides descriptive information on in-
dividual variables.
Regional level-variables
Our regional-level variables were aggregated from the
ESS data. The ESS contains a regional classification
variable that is based on nomenclature of territorial
units for statistics (NUTS). The number of regions dis-
tinguished per country depended on the size of the
country and the country-specific sample size. For some
countries, NUTS 1 was used, whereas for other coun-
tries NUTS 2 or 3 was used. We pooled data from the
first three waves of the ESS, in order to have more reli-
able estimates at the regional level.4 In some countries,
we merged regions with few respondents, based on the
criterion that the pooled dataset of ESS waves 1, 2,
and 3 should contain at least about 100 respondents
per region. After this reclassification, the number or
regions per country ranged from 3 in Belgium and
Ireland to 22 in Ukraine.
We constructed three variables indicating the propor-
tion of the total population in a region that belonged to
the Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox Church, respect-
ively. These proportions were based on the total samples
per country, thus including the respondents identifying
with ‘other’ Christian and non-Christian religions. In
addition, the regional level of religiosity was measured
as the regional mean of the individual-level religiosity
scale. This variable was standardized in order to facili-
tate the comparison between the individual-level religi-
osity variable and the regional-level religiosity level
variable, which is a standardized factor score.
Analytical Strategy
Three-level regression-models were estimated, with indi-
viduals, regions, and countries as the three levels.
Contextual religion variables were only included at the
regional level, but random slopes were specified at both
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the regional level and the country level. We only esti-
mated variances of the random effects (standard devia-
tions reported), no covariances between the random
effects, as this would make the estimation of the random
part of the model too complicated.5,6 All analyses were
conducted using the xtmixed command with restricted
maximum likelihood estimation in Stata. Information
on the order of models is provided in the Results section.
In addition, we estimated a more complex model that
included contextual and cross-level effects at both the
regional and the country level. We report on the results
of this model at the end of the results section.
Results
Table 2 provides individual-level descriptive informa-
tion on marriage attitudes and religion by country.
Countries are ordered from most to least traditional
marriage attitudes (from highest to lowest mean score).
Roughly, people in Eastern Europe hold the most trad-
itional marriage attitudes (Slovenia being an exception),
and people in the Nordic countries hold the least
traditional attitudes, together with the Dutch and the
Belgians. Other Western-European countries score in be-
tween the Eastern European and the Nordic countries.
The mean level of religiosity is highest in Cyprus and
lowest in Sweden, but the country pattern is not as clear
as for marriage attitudes. The percentage of people who
do not consider themselves as belonging to any religious
denomination ranges from less than 2 per cent in Cyprus
to 73 per cent in Estonia. Countries with the highest per-
centage of Catholics are Poland (91 per cent), Portugal
(85 per cent), and Ireland (77 per cent), Denmark and
Finland have the highest percentage of Protestants (both
61 per cent), and the highest percentages of Orthodox
are found in Cyprus (98 per cent) and Romania (82 per
cent). Switzerland, Germany, and Hungary (and to a
lesser extent: the Netherlands and Great Britain) have
substantial proportions of both Catholics and
Protestants. Latvia is the only country with roughly
equal (but rather low) percentages of all three major
Christian denominations.
Since we mainly focus on the role of the regional reli-
gious context, we also present a map showing regional
Table 1. Individual-level descriptives (N¼ 43,242)
Per cent M SD Min Max










Age 47.62 18.57 14.17 101.33
Level of education
Less than lower secondary (ISCED 0-1) 15.73
Lower secondary (ISCED 2) 21.29
Upper secondary (ISCED 3) 30.69
Post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED 4) 10.37





Farm home or home in the countryside 6.02
Country village 31.78
Town or small city 30.43
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 10.98
Big city 20.79
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variation in average religiosity scores (Figure 1). Scores are
highest in Poland, Romania, Ireland and parts of Ukraine
and Portugal, and lowest in Eastern Germany, Western
France, and parts of Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia. In most
countries, some regional variation in religiosity scores is
apparent. This variation is strongest in Spain, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, and Germany.7
Next, we examine the relationship between marriage
attitudes and religion in a series of multi-level models.
Table 3 presents three models that investigate the effects
of our three individual-level indicators for religion on
marriage attitudes. Model 1 shows that people who con-
sider themselves a member of the three major Christian
denominations score 0.217 higher on the five-point scale
of marriage attitudes than people who do not belong to
any religious denomination. This finding supports H1,
which stated that members of a Christian denomination
hold more traditional marriage attitudes than people who
do not identify with any religion. Furthermore, Model 1
shows that the effects of the control variables are in line
with expectations: Men, older individuals, less educated
individuals, first-generation immigrants, and individuals
living in the countryside hold more traditional marriage
attitudes than women, more educated individuals, those
who were born in the country in which they reside, and
those living in big cities. With regard to education, we see
that there is no difference in marriage attitudes between
those with post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED
level 4) and the reference group, upper secondary educa-
tion (ISCED level 3), but apart from that the pattern is
monotonous. The effect of urbanization is not completely
monotonous; those living in suburbs or outskirts of big
cities hold more traditional marriage attitudes than those
living in towns or small cities.
In Model 2, we distinguish between the three major
religious denominations in Europe. Catholics,
Protestants, and Orthodox all score higher than those
who do not identify with any religious denomination,
which means that members of all three denominations
hold more traditional marriage attitudes.8 The coeffi-
cients for Catholics and Protestants are very close to
each other (with the latter being slightly higher), hence



















Ukraine 3.57 (0.92) 0.25 (0.93) 8.11 2.99 62.22 26.67 22 1,837
Romania 3.46 (0.77) 0.80 (0.75) 5.72 4.98 81.68 7.62 8 2,009
Russia 3.34 (0.78) 0.35 (0.84) 0.28 0.19 47.10 52.43 10 2,136
Slovakia 3.32 (0.79) 0.39 (1.09) 65.49 8.98 0.59 24.93 8 1,536
Estonia 3.28 (0.60) 0.51 (0.76) 0.96 7.76 18.34 72.94 5 1,456
Bulgaria 3.14 (1.14) 0.24 (0.78) 0.72 0.54 70.71 28.03 6 1,113
Ireland 3.11 (0.73) 0.61 (0.96) 76.86 2.65 0.00 20.49 3 1,469
Cyprus 3.08 (0.88) 0.82 (0.71) 0.85 0.00 97.57 1.59 5 946
Poland 3.06 (0.88) 0.92 (0.79) 91.37 0.30 0.30 8.04 16 1,680
Latvia 2.98 (0.75) 0.31 (0.86) 16.06 11.44 10.86 61.64 6 1,731
Great Britain 2.97 (0.65) 0.42 (0.94) 10.95 26.88 0.15 62.02 12 1,964
Germany 2.97 (0.59) 0.36 (0.95) 24.52 31.16 0.22 44.10 14 2,696
Hungary 2.93 (0.69) 0.14 (1.00) 41.94 18.38 0.00 39.67 7 1,409
Switzerland 2.87 (0.70) 0.16 (0.93) 33.65 33.59 0.94 31.83 6 1,709
Austria 2.78 (0.82) 0.07 (0.95) 67.30 3.70 0.56 28.45 9 2,162
Portugal 2.75 (0.72) 0.42 (0.94) 85.37 0.76 0.00 13.86 5 2,092
Slovenia 2.70 (0.79) 0.04 (0.97) 47.42 0.86 1.08 50.65 12 1,394
Spain 2.65 (0.89) 0.08 (1.03) 67.65 0.28 0.78 31.30 15 1,802
France 2.65 (0.89) 0.50 (0.87) 44.41 1.28 0.21 54.09 9 1,871
Sweden 2.39 (0.77) 0.54 (0.78) 1.37 27.33 0.49 70.81 8 1,826
Belgium 2.38 (0.86) 0.25 (0.91) 40.56 0.52 0.29 58.63 3 1,726
Finland 2.35 (0.87) 0.06 (0.44) 0.00 60.63 1.18 38.19 4 1,867
The Netherlands 2.27 (0.85) 0.25 (0.99) 19.14 16.19 0.23 64.43 12 1,729
Norway 1.99 (0.83) 0.44 (0.82) 1.44 50.60 0.24 47.71 7 1,662
Denmark 1.73 (0.71) 0.38 (0.76) 0.85 60.85 0.14 38.17 14 1,420
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we did not find evidence for H2, which stated that
Protestants are less marriage oriented than Catholics.
The coefficient for the Orthodox is the highest of the
three denominations, but an additional analysis with the
Orthodox as the reference category showed that their
marriage attitudes do not differ significantly from those
of Catholics and Protestants.
In Model 3,9 we added the level of religiosity. The
effects indicate that the more religiously involved people
are, the more traditional their marriage attitudes (an in-
crease of one SD on the religiosity scale results in a
0.199 increase on the five-point scale that measures mar-
riage attitudes), hence H3 is confirmed. What is more, it
turns out that only the level of religiosity matters,
whereas denomination does not: When level of religios-
ity is taken into account, none of the denominations dif-
fer in marriage attitudes from those who do not identify
with a religious denomination. To be precise, the effect
of Protestantism is borderline significant (P ¼ 0.057),
but it has decreased from 0.276 in Model 2 to 0.066 in
Model 3. Hence the differences in marriage attitudes be-
tween people who consider themselves as member of a
Christian church and those who do not identify with any
religion should be attributed to their level of religiosity
and not to specific characteristics of the denominations.
In the next set of Models (Model 4 and 5, Table 4),
we retained denomination and level of religiosity at the
individual level, and added indicators of religion at the
regional level. In Model 4, the proportions of the region-
al population that consider themselves as a member of
each of the three major Christian churches were added.
The results show that on top of the effect of individual
level of religiosity, there are small regional effects of the
proportion of Catholics and Orthodox: the higher these
proportions relative to the proportions of people who
do not identify with any religion, the more traditional
people’s marriage attitudes are. If the proportion of
Catholics increases with 10 per cent at the cost of the
proportion of non-members, the average score on mar-
riage attitudes increases with almost 0.018 and if the
Figure 1. Average religiosity score by European region
Source: Own calculations on data from ESS waves 1–3.
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proportion of Orthodox increases with 10 per cent at
the cost of the proportion of non-members, the average
score on marriage attitudes increases with about 0.039
(on a five-point scale).10 Hence, H4 is partly confirmed;
there are positive effects of the proportion of Catholics
and Orthodox on traditional marriage attitudes, how-
ever these effects are quite small. There is no significant
effect of the proportion of Protestants.
In Model 5, the mean level of religiosity of the popu-
lation at the regional level was added. It has a positive
Table 3.Multilevel regression estimates of marriages attitudes: effects of individual-level variables (N¼ 43,242 individuals,
226 regions, 25 countries).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fixed-effect parameters b se b se b se
Constant 2.144 0.093*** 2.138 0.091*** 2.376 0.084***
Individual-level religion variables
Member of religious denomination 0.217 0.026***
Denomination
No denomination Ref Ref
Catholic 0.256 0.028*** 0.015 0.013
Protestant 0.276 0.054*** 0.066 0.034
Orthodox 0.316 0.062*** 0.048 0.027
Religiosity 0.199 0.017***
Individual-level control variables
Female 0.042 0.007*** 0.041 0.007*** 0.102 0.007***
Age 0.011 0.000*** 0.011 0.000*** 0.009 0.000***
Level of education
Less than lower secondary (ISCED 0-1) 0.209 0.013*** 0.209 0.013*** 0.185 0.012***
Lower secondary (ISCED 2) 0.086 0.011*** 0.087 0.010*** 0.080 0.010***
Upper secondary (ISCED 3) Ref Ref Ref
Post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED 4) 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.013
Tertiary (ISCED 5-6) 0.092 0.010*** 0.091 0.010*** 0.097 0.010***
Migrant 0.105 0.014*** 0.095 0.015*** 0.085 0.014***
Level of urbanization
Farm home or home in the countryside 0.065 0.018*** 0.064 0.018*** 0.049 0.018**
Country village 0.070 0.011*** 0.067 0.011*** 0.047 0.011***
Town or small city 0.023 0.011* 0.021 0.011 0.014 0.011
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 0.041 0.014** 0.039 0.014** 0.030 0.014*
Big city Ref Ref Ref
Random-effects country level
sd (Constant) 0.459 0.067 0.445 0.066 0.410 0.060
sd (Member of religious denomination) 0.114 0.021
sd (Catholic) 0.104 0.028
sd (Protestant) 0.228 0.048 0.130 0.034
sd (Orthodox) 0.202 0.064 0.000 0.001
sd (Religiosity) 0.079 0.013
Random-effects regional level
sd (Constant) 0.099 0.008 0.100 0.008 0.090 0.008
sd (Member of religious denomination) 0.103 0.011
sd (Catholic) 0.073 0.017 0.041 0.019
sd (Protestant) 0.091 0.020 0.048 0.026
sd (Orthodox) 0.165 0.024 0.149 0.022
sd (Religiosity) 0.055 0.008
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effect on marriage attitudes: the higher the population’s
mean level of religiosity, the more traditional people’s
marriage attitudes are. An increase of one SD in the
mean level of religiosity, leads to an increase of 0.069 on
the five-point scale that measures marriage attitudes.
This shows that people’s marriage attitudes are affected
by the mean level of religiosity in their region, on top of
their own level of religiosity. Hence, H5 is confirmed.
Table 4. Multilevel regression estimates of marriages attitudes: effects of individual-level and regional-level variables
(N¼ 43,242 individuals, 226 regions, 25 countries)
Model 4 Model 5
Fixed-effect parameters b se b se
Constant 2.368 0.081*** 2.366 0.080***
Individual-level religion variables
Denomination
No denomination Ref Ref
Catholic 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Protestant 0.064 0.034 0.063 0.034
Orthodox 0.042 0.026 0.042 0.026
Religiosity 0.197 0.017*** 0.197 0.017***
Regional-level religion variables
Proportion Catholics 0.178 0.084* 0.104 0.142
Proportion Protestants 0.234 0.137 0.012 0.162
Proportion Orthodox 0.387 0.138** 0.170 0.163
Mean religiosity 0.069 0.028*
Individual-level control variables
Female 0.102 0.007*** 0.102 0.007***
Age 0.009 0.000*** 0.009 0.000***
Level of education
Less than lower secondary (ISCED 0-1) 0.185 0.012*** 0.185 0.012***
Lower secondary (ISCED 2) 0.080 0.010*** 0.080 0.010***
Upper secondary (ISCED 3) Ref Ref
Post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED 4) 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.013
Tertiary (ISCED 5-6) 0.097 0.010*** 0.097 0.010***
Migrant 0.085 0.014*** 0.085 0.014***
Level of urbanization
Farm home or home in the countryside 0.047 0.018** 0.049 0.018**
Country village 0.046 0.011*** 0.046 0.011***
Town or small city 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.011
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 0.029 0.014* 0.030 0.014*
Big city Ref Ref
Random-effects country level
sd (Constant) 0.397 0.061 0.390 0.060
sd (Protestant) 0.127 0.034 0.126 0.034
sd (Orthodox) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
sd (Religiosity) 0.079 0.013 0.079 0.013
Random-effects regional level
sd (Constant) 0.089 0.008 0.086 0.008
sd (Catholic) 0.040 0.019 0.041 0.019
sd (Protestant) 0.044 0.027 0.046 0.026
sd (Orthodox) 0.144 0.022 0.141 0.022
sd (Religiosity) 0.055 0.007 0.054 0.007
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The regional effect is about one third of the effect size of
individual-level religiosity (b¼0.069 vs. b¼0.196).
Moreover, the effects of the regional denomination vari-
ables become weaker and statistically non-significant
when regional religiosity is included. Hence, at the re-
gional level we see the same as at the individual level:
level of religiosity is the most important indicator of reli-
gion for explaining marriage attitudes. In addition, we
can conclude that in the process of secularization, the
decrease in level of religiosity has a stronger influence
on marriage attitudes than the decrease in the percent-
age of church members.
The next step is to investigate whether the effects of
the different individual indicators for religion depend on
the religious context at the regional level. Although we
saw earlier that the effects of individual denomination
and the percentage of members of each denomination in
the region’s population disappeared when taking the
level of individual and regional religiosity into account,
it may still be the case that the effect of individual de-
nomination depends on the extent to which one’s own
denomination is dominant in one’s region. This is tested
in Model 6, presented in Table 5. The results indicate
that there is only an interaction between being
Orthodox and the proportion of Orthodox in the region:
the higher the proportion of Orthodox in a region, the
weaker the positive effect of being Orthodox, or in other
words: the lower the proportion of Orthodox in a re-
gion, the stronger the positive effect of being Orthodox.
This supports the idea of a reformation mechanism
(H6b) for the Orthodox: the more selective their group
is (i.e. the lower the proportion of Orthodox adherents
in their region), the more they stress traditional marriage
attitudes.
In Model 7, we added the interaction between indi-
vidual level of religiosity and mean level of regional re-
ligiosity. This interaction has a positive effect, implying
that the positive effect of individual level of religiosity is
stronger in regions where the mean level of religiosity is
higher. Or formulated the other way around: in more
secularized regions, the effect of individual religiosity is
weaker, confirming H6a. The effect is illustrated in
Figure 2, where we plot marriage attitudes against indi-
vidual level of religiosity for a person living in region
with a mean level of religiosity that is one SD above
average and for a person living a region with a mean
regional level religiosity that is one SD below average.
The figure shows not only that in the more secular
region, the effect of individual religion is weaker (i.e. the
regression line is less steep), but also that the regional
context matters little for the marriage attitudes of people
with a very low level of individual religiosity (2 SD)
whereas for people with a very high level of individual
religiosity (þ2 SD) the religiosity of the regional context
clearly does matter. Hence, this result supports the idea
of an internal secularization process: in regions where
external secularization has progressed further, religious
individuals do not follow the teachings of the Church on
marriage as strictly as in regions where external secular-
ization is less widespread. In Model 7, the effect of the
interaction between individual Orthodox denomination
and the regional percentage of Orthodox that was
observed in Model 6 remains intact. Although there
seems to be a reformation mechanism among Orthodox
adherents in regions with a low percentage of
Orthodox, we do not find evidence for such a reforma-
tion mechanism for level of religiosity among Christians
in general, but quite the opposite. In an additional
model (Supplementary Table A1) we included interac-
tions between all denominations at the individual level
and all denominations at the regional level. In this
model, the negative interaction between individual
Orthodox membership and regional proportion of
Orthodox disappears, but positive interaction effects be-
tween individual Orthodox membership and the region-
al proportions of Catholics and Protestants are found;
the Orthodox hold more traditional attitudes if they live
in areas with higher proportions of Catholics or
Protestants. Hence, the reformation process among
Orthodox that our results seem to indicate, occurs in
Catholic and Protestant regions rather than in more
secular regions.
In the models discussed so far, effects of macro-level
variables and cross-level interactions were studied at the
regional level rather than at the country level. In an add-
itional analysis (Supplementary Table A2), we included
country-level variables and cross-level interactions at
both the regional and the country level. No cross-level
interactions between individual variables and country-
level ones were statistically significant. The interaction
between individual and regional-level religiosity
remained statistically significant, suggesting that the re-
gional level is an important level to study spatial vari-
ation in the effects of religiosity.11
Conclusion and Discussion
This article studies the multifaceted relationship be-
tween Christianity and marriage attitudes. First, it
examines which aspect of religion (being a member of
any Christian denomination, being a member of a par-
ticular denomination, or the level of religiosity) is most
strongly related to marriage attitudes. This is usually
labelled the ‘individual-level effect’ of religion. Next, it
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Table 5. Multilevel regression estimates of marriages attitudes: effects of individual-level variables, regional-level varia-
bles and interactions (N¼ 43,242 individuals, 226 regions, 25 countries)
Model 6 Model 7
Fixed-effect parameters b se b Se
Constant 2.369 0.079*** 2.367 0.078***
Individual-level religion variables
Denomination
No denomination Ref Ref
Catholic 0.021 0.016 0.024 0.016
Protestant 0.062 0.036 0.064 0.035
Orthodox 0.130 0.045** 0.133 0.045**
Religiosity 0.196 0.017*** 0.196 0.016***
Regional-level religion variables
Proportion Catholics 0.096 0.143 0.080 0.143
Proportion Protestants 0.002 0.166 0.022 0.167
Proportion Orthodox 0.237 0.166 0.277 0.167
Mean religiosity 0.069 0.028* 0.064 0.028*
Cross-level interactions
Individual Catholic X regional prop. Catholics 0.039 0.053 0.051 0.051
Individual Protestant X regional prop. Protestants 0.026 0.126 0.016 0.125
Individual Orthodox X regional prop. Orthodox 0.227 0.109* 0.233 0.109*
Individual Religiosity X regional mean religiosity 0.027 0.010**
Individual-level control variables
Female 0.101 0.007*** 0.102 0.007***
Age 0.009 0.000*** 0.009 0.000***
Level of education
Less than lower secondary (ISCED 0-1) 0.184 0.012*** 0.184 0.012***
Lower secondary (ISCED 2) 0.080 0.010*** 0.080 0.010***
Upper secondary (ISCED 3) Ref Ref
Post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED 4) 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.013
Tertiary (ISCED 5-6) 0.098 0.010*** 0.097 0.010***
Migrant 0.080 0.014*** 0.081 0.014***
Level of urbanization
Farm home or home in the countryside 0.049 0.018** 0.049 0.018**
Country village 0.047 0.011*** 0.046 0.011***
Town or small city 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.011
Suburbs or outskirts of big city 0.030 0.014* 0.030 0.014*
Big city Ref Ref
Random-effects country level
sd (Constant) 0.383 0.059 0.381 0.059
sd (Protestant) 0.129 0.036 0.127 0.035
sd (Orthodox) 0.080 0.060 0.079 0.060
sd (Religiosity) 0.079 0.013 0.075 0.013
Random-effects regional level
sd (Constant) 0.086 0.008 0.086 0.008
sd (Catholic) 0.043 0.019 0.044 0.019
sd (Protestant) 0.046 0.026 0.046 0.027
sd (Orthodox) 0.139 0.022 0.139 0.022
sd (Religiosity) 0.054 0.007 0.054 0.007
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examines whether the religious macro-context influen-
ces the marriage attitudes in a society, even if individual-
level effects are considered. This is usually labelled the
‘contextual-level’ effect. Finally, it examines whether the
religious macro-context differentially affects the reli-
gious and the non-religious. This is usually labelled the
‘cross-level’ effect. Distinguishing these three types of
effects is important, as it shows in more detail how a key
institution like religion influences societal values regarding
marriage. Data from the third wave of the ESS, conducted
in 2006, were used to test a series of hypotheses about the
relationship between Christianity and marriage attitudes
and how this relationship differs across regions.
Our results show that Christians in Europe hold
more traditional marriage attitudes than those who are
not religious. However, it turns out that mainly the level
of religiosity of individuals matters (H3 is confirmed).
Once we take the level of individual religiosity into ac-
count, no differences in marriage attitudes between
Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants were observed,
nor differences between any of these denominations and
those who are religiously unaffiliated. Thus, it is the
strength of an individual’s engagement with religion (as
indicated by their religious self-identification, and their
level of public—via attendance of church services—and
private—via prayer—commitment) that is associated
with their marriage attitudes, not their denominational
membership. It suggests that it is not the type of specific
denominational instruction that religious people receive
that is shaping their attitudes towards marriage. Rather,
it seems the more religious people are, the more serious
they take notions about the sacramental or covenantal
nature of marriage that are central to most religious
teaching.
There is one caveat to this general conclusion. Our
study focused on the non-affiliated and the members of
the three main Christian denominational strands in
Europe. Given our comparative focus, members of small
Christian groupings outside the mainstream and mem-
bers of non-Christian religions, like Muslims and Jews,
could not be delineated, as their numbers were too
small in many countries, let alone in many regions.
Furthermore, within the three mainstream denomina-
tions, no further subdivisions were possible. It could be
that being a church member has an additional effect on
top of level of religiosity if specific subgroups of denomi-
nations could have been distinguished. For instance, it
could be that members of more strict churches within
Protestantism hold more traditional family related atti-
tudes than the majority of Protestant church members.
Our findings also show that the link between
Christianity and marriage attitudes does not only exist
at the individual level. Religious context matters as well.
Again, it is the mean level of religiosity in a region that
matters, not the size of particular denominations. This
confirms hypothesis 5, and does not confirm hypothesis
4. Two important conclusions can be drawn from these
findings. First, people in contexts that are very religious
hold more traditional marriage attitudes than people in
less religious contexts, irrespective of whether people
themselves are religious. It suggests that religion has a
pervasive and often long-lasting impact on cultural con-
texts. In more religious contexts, the religious and the
non-religious are more reluctant to deviate from central
moral prescriptions enshrined in religious traditions.
Second, the fact that the mean level of religiosity rather
than the size of particular denominations is more im-
portant suggests, again, that particularities of specific
Figure 2.Marriage attitudes by individual level of religiosity and regional level of religiosity
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denominations do not seem to matter so much. As at the
individual level, it is the level of religiosity within a re-
gion that matters, not whether one is Catholic,
Protestant, or Orthodox.
Our final set of hypotheses concerned whether the
strength of the link between individual religiosity and
marriage attitudes depends on the religious regional con-
text. One line of reasoning suggests that religious people
are more likely to adapt their marriage attitudes to those
of the non-religious if they live in a very secular region,
that is, the effect of individual religiosity is smaller in
secular regions than in religious regions (H6A), whereas
the other line of reasoning suggests that the former ra-
ther want to distance themselves from the non-religious
in a secular context, that is, the effect of individual re-
ligiosity is larger in secular regions than in religious
regions (H6B). The results clearly favour the first of
these two hypotheses. Although the more religious hold
more positive marriage attitudes in both low and high
religious contexts, the difference between both groups is
much smaller in low than in high religious contexts.
This suggests that the adaptation mechanism that we
hypothesized is at work. At the same time, selective mi-
gration may play a role as well. Not all people with the
same level of religiosity will adhere equally strongly to
strict moral teachings. It could be that religious people
with relatively tolerant moral beliefs are likely to move
from regions that are strongly religious to regions that
are less religious, whereas religious people with strict
moral beliefs are more likely to move in the opposite dir-
ection (or stay in their religious region). This alternative
explanation cannot be tested with the ESS data.
Longitudinal information on migration and religiosity
would be needed to do so.
In addition, one denominational cross-level effect
was found. Members of the Orthodox churches were
more likely to hold traditional marriage attitudes in
regions with relatively large representations of Catholics
and/or Protestants. One possible explanation for this
finding is that Orthodoxy may experience a stronger
challenge to formulate clear moral guidelines in contexts
in which it constitutes a minority denomination and
experiences the competition of other denominations.
This situation is more common for Catholicism and
Protestantism, and may thus pose less of a challenge for
these strands of Christianity.
Some of the limitations of this study have already been
touched upon in the conclusions above: First, we only
focused on the three major strands of Christianity in
Europe. No attention was paid to Islam. Although a reli-
gion of growing importance in Europe, the proportion of
Muslims is still low in many regions and their
representation in surveys like the ESS is (too) weak to in-
clude them. It would be interesting to see whether the ex-
tent to which they adhere to marriage attitudes also
depends on the religious context, and whether it matters
for them whether that context is secularized (few religious
people at all) or dominated by Christians (many religious
people, but from another faith). Second, although we dis-
entangled effects of membership, denomination and level
of religiosity, we could not investigate which mechanisms
are behind the influence of religiosity at the regional level.
Does religion influence even those who are not religious
through its influence on institutions or through culture?
Our finding that the contextual effect of religiosity oper-
ated at the regional level rather than at the national level
suggests that culture may be the more important mechan-
ism as institutional power will probably vary little within
countries. Third, in our theoretical interpretation of the
results, we assume that religious affiliation influences mar-
riage attitudes. However, it could also be that people’s atti-
tudes towards marriage influences whether they remain
church members and ultimately their level of religiosity.
This makes the causal interpretation of the relationship be-
tween individual religiosity and marriage attitudes
ambiguous.
To these limitations we add a final one. To investi-
gate the effect of religion at a contextual level, we
focused on the regional level. We believe that this is an
improvement in comparison to studies that focus on the
country level, because there is within-country variation
in membership, denomination and level of religiosity.
Moreover, we did not find interaction effects between
individual- and country-level indicators of religion. Two
remarks on this finding are in order. First, our regional
analysis is mainly based on NUTS regions. However, to
derive reliable estimates of regional levels of religiosity,
we sometimes had to combine regions with few respond-
ents. As a result, regions with low population density
are somewhat underrepresented in our overall sample.
Second, the regional level is not necessarily the best level
of aggregation when investigating influences of the reli-
gious context. One could argue that influences of reli-
gion operate at even lower contextual levels such as that
of the local community. In addition, one could argue
that the ‘borders’ of religious areas such as bible belts do
not necessarily follow the borders of NUTS regions.
Thus, there is a clear potential for further research on
the most ‘appropriate’ level of aggregation at which reli-
gious context effects are at work.
Notes
1 The increase of Islam in many European societies
would have made it very interesting to include
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Islam in this study as well. However, the number of
respondents identifying themselves as Muslims in
the 2006 ESS is relatively small; their numbers are
too few in many regions.
2 We use the generic term Orthodoxy to include dif-
ferent, often country-based variants, like Russian
Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Romanian Orthodox,
etc. The same variety exists in Protestantism that
includes a.o. Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican
strands.
3 This experimental design did not affect our results.
Although respondents who got questions about
men reported a higher level of disapproval (i.e.
more traditional marriage attitudes) than respond-
ents who got questions about women (Rijken and
Liefbroer, 2016), we did not include this gender
wording variable in our models, as it was unrelated
to our independent variables (because of
randomization).
4 Not all countries participated in all 3 waves: 17
countries participated in 3 waves, three countries
participated in wave 2 and 3, and the five remain-
ing countries only participated in wave 3.
5 This implies that all covariances between the ran-
dom effects are estimated independently (or in
other words: restricted to be zero). This is the de-
fault option for the variance-covariance structure
of the random effects for mixed models in Stata.
6 As is standard in statistical packages for multi-level
analysis, no statistical significance of the random
effects is reported as no agreed upon test for single
random effects parameters is available. The usual z-
tests do not work as variances cannot be negative
and thus the 0-hypothesis is on the boundary of the
parameter space.
7 Maps with the regional distribution of denomin-
ational membership can be found in the online
Supplementary Materials.
8 Each of these three coefficients is higher than the
coefficient of ‘member of religious denomination’
in Model 1 (b ¼ 0.217). One would expect this co-
efficient to be a weighted mean of the three coeffi-
cients of the religious denominations in Model 2,
because the three denominations are grouped to-
gether in the variable ‘religious identification’. The
difference in the effect sizes is due to the different
specification of the random slopes in Model 1 and
2: in Model 1 we only included a random slope for
being a member of a religious denomination,
whereas in Model 2 we included random slopes for
each of the three denominations.
9 In this and subsequent models we did not include
the random slope for ‘Catholic’ at the country level,
because when it was included (i.e. when we speci-
fied a model with random slopes for all religion
variables), standard errors of the random param-
eter estimates could not be calculated. However,
the parameter estimates in that model (without
SE’s) are almost virtually identical to the parameter
estimates in the model presented (and there was no
variation for Catholic at the country level).
10 Note that Catholic, Protestant and Eastern
Orthodox are proportional variables that sum to
100 per cent together with the non-member cat-
egory. Therefore, one cannot interpret the effect of
any of these variables as the effect of an increase in
one denomination at the cost of the other denomi-
nations, because that would violate the ceteris pari-
bus assumption. Therefore, we have to interpret the
effects as the effect of an increase of the proportion




11 Additionally, we ran our final model (Model 7 in
Table 5) separately for the three separate attitude
items that constitute our marriage attitudes scale.
Results were generally in line with those for the
overall scale. These models are presented in
Supplementary Tables A3–A5.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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